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Abstract
This paper presents a certification mechanism for verifying the
secure flow of information through a program. Because it exploits the
properties of a lattice structure among security classes, the procedure
is sufficiently simple that it can easily be included in the analysis
phase of most existing compilers. Appropriate semantics are presented
and proved correct. An important application is the confinement problem:
the mechanism can prove that a program cannot cause supposedly nonconfidential results to depend on confidential input data.
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Introduction
Computer system security relies in part on Information flow control,

that is, on methods of regulating the dissemination of information among
objects throughout the system.

An information flow policy specifies a set

of security classes for information, a flow relation defining permissible
flows among these classes, and a method of binding each storage object
to some class.

An operation, or series of operations, that uses the value

of some object, say x, to derive a value for another, say y, causes a flow
from x to y .

This flow is admissible in the given flow policy only if

the security class of x flows into the security class of y.

Prior work on the enforcement of flow policies has concentrated on
run time mechanisms. One type of mechanism enforces a given flow policy
by controlling processes' read and write access rights to objects:

no

process may acquire read access for an input object, or write access for
an output object, unless the security class of every input flows into the
security class of every output -- even if some outputs depend on only a
subset of the inputs.

ADEPT-50 [30] , the Case system [29], the MITRE

system [3» 23], and the Privacy Restriction Processor [26] are of this type.
These mechanisms are generally easy to implement because they make no
attempt to examine the structure of a program.

A second type of (more

complex) mechanism accounts for program structures in order to determine
flows between specific input and output objects.

Fenton's data mark

machine [10], the mechanism of Gat and Saal [13]» and the surveillance
mechanism of Jones and Lipton [19] are of this type.

The surveillance

mechanism employs a program transformation to insure that all flows are
properly accounted for at run time.
mechanisms can be found in [ 7 ] .

A detailed discussion of all these
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This paper presents a compile time mechanism that certifies
a program only if it specifies no flows in violation of the flow policy.
Besides the aesthetic attraction of establishing a program's security
before it executes, a certification mechanism has important advantages.
It can be specified directly in terms of language structures, which facilitates its comprehension and its proof of correctness.
the need for run time checking.
speed.

It greatly reduces

It does not impair a program's execution

(See also [23]) .

Prior certification does not completely eliminate the need for
run time checking.

Run time support is needed to raise the tolerance against

hardware malfunctions and other threats to the integrity of certified
programs.

It is needed to verify that computed addresses remain in the

ranges assumed for them during certification.

It is needed to control

covert channels, which allow flows outside the storage objects of the system.

2

Lattice Model of Information Flow
We give a brief review of the flow model on which the certification

mechanism is based [6, 7]•

The model generalizes earlier work as reported

in [3, 9, 10, 11, 23, 26, 29, 30].

2.1

Policy Description and,Properties
A flow policy can be represented by (s,

security classes and

is a flow relation specifying permissible flows

between pairs of classes.
variable^

array»

, where S is a given set of

or file

Each storage object x -- e.g., constant,

scalar

-- is assigned (bound) to a security class,

denoted by underbar, x.

The notation x

thus means that a flow from

object x to object y is permissible in the flow policy.

We will suppose

that the binding of each object t;o a security class is static, and can
be determined from the declarations contained in a program.
Under the reasonable assumptions that there is a finite number of
security classes, that the flow relation is reflexive (i.e., x + ^ i s
always permissible), and that the flow relation is transitive (i.e.,
x^ •*• £

£ inpl ies jk •*• z), we may suppose that {s, + ) is a lattice.

This means that, corresponding to any pair of classes, there are unique
upper and lower bound classes.

If (S, •+) is not a lattice, It may be

transformed into one by adding new classes as necessary without changing
the flows among the original classes [8].

The lattice properties are

exploited to construct an efficient certification mechanism.
The symbols ® and 8 denote, respectively, the associative and
commutative least upper bound and greatest lower bound operators of the
lattice (s, •+) [kt 28J.

The least upper bound is defined so that x. •+ ^

for I • l,...,m is equivalent to the relation x , ® ... ® x •*• y .
—I
—m
-L

It can

be envisaged as requiring that flows from various operand classes must
pass through a single, common class en route to a given result class.
The greatest lower bound is defined so that x_-»•
equivalent to the relation x -*• ^

8 ... 8

for J

H

1

n is

It can be envisaged as

requiring that flows from a given operand class must pass through a singl
common class en route to various result classes.

There is a h i ghest

if

class H , which is the least upper bound of all classes, and a least class
L, which is the greatest lower bound of all classes.
All unnamed programming language constants are members of L.

This

assumption is reasonable since the flow of an ordinary constant, say "99",
into a variable, say x , puts in x no information about any other object.
Only when "99" is known to be the value of an object y for which ^ A- x
must its flow be prevented; but this is done by restricting the flow
from y , not from "99".
Figures I and 2 illustrate lattices that arise frequently in practice.
Figure 1 is a linear "priority lattice" on n classes 0,l,..,,n-l, where
L s 0 and H=n-1.

This lattice applies to the simple confinement problem with

classes nonconfidential (0) and confidential (l) [10] and to the corwnon
military security problem with classes unclassified (0), confidential
secret (2), and top secret (3) [30].

(1),

Figure 2 shows a more complex

"property lattice" representing the immediate inclusions among all 2 n
subsets of n=3 properties represented as bit vectors.
easily to any value of n.

It generalizes

It is used in systems where information may flow

only to a security class having at least the same properties as the
originating class [3, 23, 29, 30].

2.2

Flow
Information flows from object x to object y , denoted x -> y, whenever

information stored in x is transferred to, or used to derive information
transferred to, object y.

A program statement specifies a flow x => y if

execution of the statement could result in a flow x => y .

S

={0,1,...,n-l}

I -»• j i f f r <_ j

n
|
n-1
{

i • j = max (i,J)
i 8 j = min (i,j)
L - 0,

H - n - 1

Description

Precedence graph
F i gure 1.

S

t0
Linear priority lattice

= {000,001,..., 111}
110

A •+ B i ff

0R(A,B) = B

101

t X 010X t

100
A • B -

Oil
001

0R(A,B)
000

A 8 B =

AND(A,B)
Precedence graph

L - 000,

H = 111

Descr i pt ion

Figure 2 . Property lattice for n™3.
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F1ows a re explicit or i mp1i c i t.

An exp1\c i t f1ow x => y occurs

whenever the operations generating it are independent of the value of x .
Assignment statements, I/O statements, and value-returning procedure calls
generate explicit flows.

An implici t flow x »> y occurs whenever a

statement specifies a flow from some arbitrary z to y , but execution
depends on the value of x .

Consider for example the statements

y: = 1; j_f x=0 then y: =0,
where x is either 0 or 1.

On termination of these statements, x=y

whether or not the then clause was executed.
causes an implicit flow x a > y.

Hence the j_f statement

In general, all conditional structures

generate implicit flows.
It should be noted that the relation => is transitive, that is,
x => y => z implies x => z.

If x => y because some function having x

as an operand stores its result in y , the flow Is di rect; otherwise it
is ind i rect.

An assignment "y

f (...,x,...)" thus causes flow x => y

directly, while the pair "z := f(...,x,...); y

g(...,z,...)" causes

flow x => y indirectly.

2.3

Security Requirements
A program p is secure if and only if no execution of p results in

a flow x => y unless x

.

^

necessary and sufficient condition for the

securlty of p is then
(1)

"x => y for some execution of p only If x •»•

7

Unfortunately, condition (1) Is generally undecldable.

Any procedure

purported to decide It could be applied to the statement
If f(x) halts

then

y := 0 ,

and thus provide a solution to the halting problem for an arbitrary recursive
function [2k].

(in a related study, Harrison, Ruzzo, and Ullman have shown

that, without severe restrictions, protection systems contain Intractable,
if not undecidable, accessing Questions [16]).
The undecldabi1Ity Is removed If we replace (?) with the security
condi tIon
(2)

"x => y Is specified by p only If x

+

The previous J_f statement can clearly be tested for this condition.
However, security condition (2) gives less precision In program certification
than (1).

For example, consider the program
I f x-0 then i f xj<0 then y

z

and a flow relation that disallows only z => y .

This program Is secure by

(1) since no execution of it can result in z •»> y; but it will not be certified
by a mechanism based on (2) since it specifies z => y.

There Is no reason

to believe that loss of precision is avoidable; Jones and Lipton, for example,
have shown that it Is not even possible to construct a mechanism that rejects
exactly the Insecure executions of a program £193 The certification mechanism to be presented is based on condition (2).
It determines whether a given program specifies Invalid flows.
Irrespective of whether the program can ever execute them.
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3

The Certification Mechanism
When the security classes of variables are declared in a program and

are static, it is easy to incorporate the certification process into the
analysis phase of a compiler.

The mechanism wi11 be presented in the form

of certification semantics — actions for the compiler to perform, along
with usual semantic actions such as type checking and code generation, when
a string of a given syntactic type Is recognized.

This procedure differs

from an information tracing procedure given by Moore 125]: ours verifies
program flows against a standard, whereas Moore's seeks primarily to
construct a flow graph.

When external objects, such as files and separately compiled procedures,
are bound to a program, the linker must verify that the actual security
class of each such object corresponds properly to the security class declared
formally for it in the program.

This must be done before a program is executed.

The certification mechanism exploits lattice properties for efficiency.
The transitive flow relation Implies that sequences of secure direct flows
are secure and, hence, the semantics need only certify the direct flows
implied by each syntactic type.

The least upper and greatest lower bound

properties greatly simplify the amount of information needed to track the
origins and destinations of flows.

Suppose x^

x m are sources of infor-

mation for some receiving object y, as in an assignment statement "y
f{xj,...,x m )" or in an output statement "output x^
than certify
2S.J ® •

®

x m is y " .

Rather

^ separately for each i, the compiler may form A =
a s

t h e

source objects are recognized, and verify simply A -»•

—

y

only a single internal variable representing the maximal class of the
source objects is needed.

Now, suppose y,,...,y are to receive information
i
n

derived from some source object x , as in an input statement "input yj,...,y
from x " , or in a structure generating implicit flows from an object x in a
conditional expression to objects yj in that structure's scope.
than certify x
9 ... 8 ^
x

•*• ^

Rather

separately for each j, the compiler may form B =

as .the receiving objects are being recognized, and verify simply

-»• B -- only a single internal variable representing the minimal

class of the receiving objects is needed.
The presentation of the full mechanism has been divided into four
parts: a) assignment, I/O, and simple control structures; b) general control
structures and complex data structures; c) procedure calls; and finally
d) exception handling.

3.1

Assignment, 1/0, and Simple Control Structures
We consider a programming language that supports only the elementary

data types integer, Boolean, and fi1e.
straightforward.

Extensions to other types are

Arithmetic and Boolean expressions are formed from variables

and constants as in Pascal [31].

The control structures specify assignment,

Input and output with files, selection (by an \f_ statement), and iteration
(by a while statement).

A program comprises a list of declarations, including

security class declarations, followed by the executable statements.
example program is given in Figure 3(a).

An
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Table I gives the syntax and certification semantics for this language.
To avoid ambiguities in the semantics, multiple occurrences of the same
syntactic type are distinguished (e.g., <x>, <x>^, and < x > 2 ) •
class of a syntactic type <x> is denoted by <x>.

T h e

security

A compiler variable,

CERTIFIED, Is initialized to true and set to false if the compiler ever
detects a flow specification violating the flow relation.

A program is

certified as secure if and only if CERTIFIED = true after the entire program
has been analyzed.

The reader ; s referred to Gries [15, Sect. 12.2] for

an exposition of additional semantic actions, e.g., code generation, that
must be defined to complete the compiler.

Figure A illustrates the certification of a simple assignment
"c := a*2+b".
statement.
subtree.

The overall parse can be represented as a syntax tree for the

The security classes (in parentheses) are shown opposite each

The semantic actions in effect propagate the security classes of

expressions up the tree and verify the flow when the assignment operator
is accounted for at the top.
Figure 3(b) shows the certification actions for the example program.
When the selection and iteration statements are recognized (lines 20 and
22), the implicit flows from the controlling expressions (the • of the
operand classes) to the variables receiving flows in their scopes (the 8
of all such variable classes) are checked.

The example program is certified.
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1
2
3
k
5
6

begin
i,n: integer security class L;
flag: Boolean security class L;
f1,f2: file security class L;
x,sum: Integer security class H;
f3,fk: file security class H;

7
8
9

begin
n
0;
sum
0;
while I < 100 do
begin
Input flag from f I;
output flag to f2;
Input x from f3;
H flag then
begin
n
n + 1;
sum := sum + x
end;
i
i + 1
end;

M
12
13
U
15
16
17
18

19
2 0

21
2 2

23

end

2k

25

output n , sum, sum/n Jto

I
{L
L)
0 + n
(L+L)
0 -»- Turn (L -> H)
~
f]_
flag (L -»• L)
flag
f2 (L •+• L)
f3 •+ x "Th
H)
~
n • j_ ji (L <+ L)
sum 9 x
sum (H
H)
flag -»• n 9 sum (l -»• L)
! • I * " ! TIT- L)
1 9 100 + flag 9 f2 8 x 8
n^ 9 sum 8 J_ (L •*• L)
n 9 sum 9 sum 9 —n -*• f<» (H •+• H)
—

end
a)

Program

Figure 3.

b)

Certification Checks

A Program and its Certification.

Syntax Rule
Declarations
1

<type> : i n t e g e r

2

<Idl1st>

3

<decl>

A

<decllst>

[ Boolean | file

<ident> | <IdIist> , <ident>
<id1ist> : <type> securi ty class
<decl> ] <declist> ; <decl>

Expressions
5

<addop> ::= + | - | v

6

<mulop> : *

7

<relop>

8

<var> ::= <ident>

9

<file> ::= <ident>

| / | a

: : = < | l l = | »

t

) l ] >

10

<factor>

11

<factor>

12

<factor> : (

13

<factor>

14

<term> ::»<factor>

15

<term> :

<term>j <mulop> <factor>

16

<aexp>

<term>

17

<aexp> ::= <aexp>j <addop> <term>

18

<exp>

19

<exp> ::» <aexp>. <relop> <aexp>^

Table i.

<var>
:<cons>
<exp> )
- <factor>j

<aexp>

Basic Certification Semantics.

Certification Semantics

<security class>

for each <ident> In <idlist> associate
<security class> with <ident> in the symbo
table entry for <ident>

<var> := < i den t>
<fi1e> := <ident>
<factor> := <var>
<factor>

L (the least class)

<factor> :«= <exp>
<factor> := <factor>j
<term> := <factor>
<term>

<term>| A <factor>

<aexp> :° <term>
<aexp> := <aexp>| • <term>
<exp> := <aexp>
<exp> := <aexp>. C <aexp>„

Syntax Rule
Assignment
20

<stmt>

<var>

<exp>

Input
21

<Inllst> ::» <var>

22

<In Ii st> : < I n 1 i st>| , <var>

23

<stmt> : i n p u t

<inl i st> from <file>

Output
2U

<outllst>

25

<outli st> ::=> <outlist>j , <exp>

26

<stmt> : o u t p u t <outlist> to <flle>

<exp>

Compound
27

<stlist>

28

<stlist>

29

<stmt>

:<stmt>
<stllst> 1 ; <stmt>
begin <stlist> end

Selection
30

<stmt>

j_f <exp> then <stmt>j [else <stmt> 2 ]

Iteratlon
31

<stmt> ::•» whl le <exp> do <stmt>j

Program
32

<prog>

Table I, cont.

begin <declist> ; <stmt> end

Certification Semantics

<stmt> :- <var>
if not (<exp> -»• <var>) then CERTIFIED

<inlist>

<var>

<inlist>

<inlist>, 8 <var>

fa ise

<stmt> := <in 11st>
if not (<file>
<lnlist>) then CERTIFIED

false

<outli st> := <exp>
<outl i st> : =• <out 1 ist>^ $ <exp>
<stmt> :- <file>
if not (<outl ist>

<f i le>) then CERTIFIED

false

<stl ist> :• <stmt>
<stlist>

<stllst> t 8 <stmt>

<stmt> := <st]i st>

<stmt> := <stmt>. [8 <stmt> 2 ]
if not (<exp>
<stmt>) then CERTIFIED

<stmt>
<stmt> 1
if not (<exp> -*• <stmt> then CERTIFIED

false

false

if CERTIFIED then certify <prog> else report security
violation. (CERTIFIED is initialized to true and set to
false if a violation is detected)

1<I

a • b •*• c 7

<aexp> (a)

<addop>

<term> (a)
< te rm> (a)

I
"
<factor> (a)
I
<var> (a)

<mulop>

I*

7^rm>

<factor* (b)

<factor> (L)

I
<cons>
I
2

(L)

<ident> (a)

I

•F?9ure V

(b)

Certification Tree of an Assignment Statement.

I

<var> (b)
<ident> (b)
I
b
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The correctness of the certification semantics is straightforwardly
established.

Let Xj

x^ denote the operands (source objects) in an

<exp> or an <outlist>, and y 1
an <inlist> or <stmt>.
(pi)

<exp>
•1

-

(p2)

<lnl lst>

y^ the results (receiving objects) in

From Table I, it is easy to deduce that

<outllst>
————

" X . 9 ... 9 x
—I
—m

=

= ^

<stmt>

9 ... 9

^

We wish to prove:
Theorem.

A program is certified only if it is secure.

The proof is an induction on the structure Index i of a given program p; i
is simply the number of <stmt> nodes in a syntax tree for p.
consider i«l.
1)

As a basis,

There are three cases for the single simple <stmt> constituting

Suppose <stmt> = "<var> :• <exp>".

Let x.l

of <exp>; by (pi), <exp> » x^ 9 ... 6

x m denote the operands

The program Is certified only

if <exp> -»• <var> (Rule 20), and thus only when it is secure.
<stmt> «= "input <inlist> from <flle> n .
in <in1ist>; by (p2), <inlist> = ^

Let y^

2)

Suppose

y n denote the variables

9 ...

program Is certified

only if <f i ie> -»• <inl ist> (Rule 23), and thus only when it is secure.
3)

Suppose <stmt> - "output <oytlist> to <file>".

the objects in <outlist>; by (pi), <out1 lst>
Is certified only If <outlist>
is secure.

a

Let xj,...,x m be all

Xj • ••• ® x ^

The program

<f I le> (Rule 26), and thus only when It

Thus the theorem holds for all programs of one simple statement.

As an induction hypothesis, assume that the theorem holds whenever the
program's structure Index satisfies 1 £ i < J , and consider a program
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p for which i » J.

There are two cases.

form <stmt> » "begin <stlist> end."

I)

p Is d compound statement of the

The semantics assume that <stmt> Is

certified whenever <stlist> Is (Rule 29).

Since <stllst> denotes a sequence

of statements each with index not exceeding J-l, and since the transitivity
of the flow relation implies that any sequence of secure flows is secure,
<stmt> Is secure when <stlist> is.
statement of the form

x . ®...® x .
J
—m

p Is a selection or iteration

<stmt> = "jrf <exp> then <stmt>j [else <stmt> 2 ]" or

"while <exp> do <stmt>j".
<exp>
•

2)

Let x.,..., x

be the operands of <exp>; by (pi),

Let y,,...,y be the objects receiving flows specified
i
n

by <stmt>j [and <stmt> 2 ]; by (p2) and Rule 30, <stmt> = <s_tmt> | [8 <stmt>^j 0 ...

By induction <stmt>^ [and <stmt> 2 ], having structure indices

not exceeding J-l, are certified only if secure.
certi fy <stmt> only i f x ^ ® ... •

^

However, Rules 30 and 31
a n d

8 ...

the selection or iteration statement is secure.

tfius

0 0

^

w

*1en

This completes the correct-

ness proof of the certification semantics.

3.2

General Control and Data Structures
The method of certifying the jj_f and whi le statements can be extended

to any selection or Iteration structure expressible as a single statement.
This Includes, for example, the Pascal repeat, for, and case statements 13?3.
The prl nciple is to identify the operands xj,...,x m of the controlling expression and the objects yj
ture, and then verl fy that

y n receiving flows within the scope of the struc® ...

8

•••

This technique can be extended to control structures arising from
arbitrary goto statements.

However, certifying a program with unrestricted

1/

gal£s requires a control flow analysis of the program to determine the objects
receiving flows within the scope of a conditional expression.

(This analysis

Is unnecessary If gotos are restricted — e.g., to loop exits - - s o that
the scope of conditional expressions can be determined during syntax analysts).
Following is an outline of the analysis required to do the certification.
All basic blocks (single-entry, single-exit substructures) are Identified.
A control flow graph is constructed, showing transitions among basic blocks;
associated w|th block bj is an expression ej that selects the successor of b.
In the graph.

(How to do this is detailed In [I, 22]).

The security class

of block bj Is the greatest lower bound of the security classes of all objects
receiving flows In bj (If there are no such objects, this class Is H).

The

Immediate forward dominator IFD(b.) Is computed for each block b^; It is the
closest block to b. among the set of blocks which lie on all paths from b.
to the program exit.
b. to IFD(b.).

Define Bj as the set of all blocks on some path from

The security class Bj is the greatest lower bound of the

classes of blocks in B { .

Since the only blocks directly conditioned on the

selector expression e. of b. are those In B^, the program is secure If each
block b. Is Independently secure and

B_j for all i.

Full details of this

procedure, with examples, are given In [6].

The mechanism can also be extended to handle complex data structures.
We shall consider arrays and records to Illustrate the method; Table M
the semantics.

shows

We assume .that, Just as they are of the same data type, the

elements of an array are of the same security class.

The certification

semantics specify that, as an array reference Is processed, the classes of .
the subscripts should be Joined

with that of the array, yielding a class

21

<array ref> « <ident> • <subllst> (Rule 35).

This Is sufficient as long as

the array reference is a source object In an expression.

If, however, the

array reference is a receiving object, e.g., on the left side of an assignment
statement, the relation <subl lst>

<Ident> must also be verified.

This is

because information about the subscripts flows Into the array iri this case —
e.g., after the assignment "a[i]

1" is made on an all-zero array, the

value of i can be deduced by searching for the first non-zero element.
Since <array ref> • <ident> 9 <subllst> is computed for any array reference
(Rule 35)» and since then <sublist>

<ldent> implies <sublist> ® <Ident> -

<ident>, this check reduces to testing whether <array ref> «» <ident> when
<array ref> is recognized as receiving a flow.

We have not shown this check

in the certification tables.

As a general rule, certification semantics must generate code that
verifies whether computed addresses refer to the objects assumed during
certification.

Thus the array semantics must verify that the subscripts

select elements in the declared range of the array (Rule 35).

Without this,

a statement like M a [ i ] :»b" might cause an Invalid flow b •> c, where c is
an object addressed by a[i] when I Is out of range.

A record r Is a structure comprising fields x,,...,x , the I'th element
i
m
being referenced by the compound name r.x..

Having a distinct name, each

element can be assigned to a different security class.
r.Xj ® —

•

r, x

m'

is similarly defined.

The notation ®r_ denotes

An operation copying a record

from a file f into r is secure only If f_

An operation copying a

record r into a file f Is secure only I f

•*• f_. An assignment "r :- s"

for two records of Identical structure Is secure only If s.x^
each I.

r.Xj for

(A stronger, but not equivalent, requirement is_ •*• Bjr would be

easier to implement).

Syntax Rule
Arrays
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<sublist>

:<exp>

3b

<subllst>

35

<array ref> : < i d e n t >

<sublist>j , <exp>
[ <subllst> ]

Records
36

<stmt>

37

<stmt> ::» output <rec> to <flle>

38

<stmt> ::= <rec>. := <rec>„

Table II.

input <rec> from <flle>

Certification of Arrays and Records

Certification Semantics
<sublist> := <exp>
<subl?st>

<subl Ist>^ ® <exp>

<array ref>
<Ident> 9 <sub1ist>
generate subscript range checking code

<stmt> : = 8 <rec>
If not (<fi 1e>

<stmt>) then CERTIFIED :- false

<stmt> := <file>
if not (C<rec>

<stmt>) then CERTIFIED

false

Xifi «<rec>j
« * i fXand <rec>^ have corresponding elements
1
n
then
if not (<rec>j .x. -*• <rec>^ .x. for all i)
then CERTIFIED := false
<stmt>

8<re_c> |

else TYPE ERROR

true

3.3

Procedure Calls
A program p Is secure only If It cal1s certifled procedures for which

the linkage flows are secure.
parameters x^

Let q be a procedure with formal input

x^ and formal output parameters yj,...,y .

Consider

a call to q in p of the form
cal1 q ( a ) , . . . b j , . . . , b
where

),

are taken as th-i actual input parameters and bj

as the actual output parameters of the call.

tr

The security of the call

requires three conditions be verified:
a)

q is secure,
* —]

c

)

ij

kj

f o r

'

=

''•••>m>

a n d

for j =• 1,.. .,n.

Should the cal1 statement appear in the scope of conditional expressions
the Implicit flows from

to objects that could receive

values during execution of q , must be verified.

To this end, the compiler

of q must Identify all objects C j , . . . , ^ to wliich q specifies flows; among
them will be the formal output parameters of q.

The security of the calI

statement requires that
d)

e, • ... • e. -»- c, 8 ... 0 c„.
—I
—k —I
HI

If (d) is verified, then by (c) e ^ « ... 6 e^ -+• ^

bj for each actual

output bj of q .
Unless p and q are compiled together, conditions (a)-(d) cannot be
verified at the same time.

However, the certifier can output Into the
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separately compiled p and q information used subsequently by a linker to
certify the linkage flows. On recognizing a call to q in p, the certifier outputs
the list of rrrt-n+1 classes (a,
—i

a : b.,.. . ,b ; e. ® ... ® e. ) .
——l
—n —I
—k

For

procedure q , it outputs the list of m+n+1 security classes (x,,...,x ;
—I
—m
^ j , . . . , ^ ; £j 9 ... 9

.

By matching these lists, the linker can verify

condi t ions (b)- (d) .
This mechanism permits constructing a procedure q which outputs results
of a higher class than the inputs.

This is convenient when q itself., or

confidential information used by q to compute its results, must be protected.
The flow of information computed by q can be restricted to actual outputs
of high security classes.
The foregoing approach poses a serious limitation in designing a procedure
q for handling arbitrary classes of information, as is typical of library
procedures.

The formal inputs xj,...,x m must be declared in the highest

secur i ty class H so that

_x. (i = 1,... ,m) can be ver i f i ed for all ca 11 s .

This implies that y,,-..,y must also be declared in H, since they will be
I
n
derived from xj,...,x m .

This in turn implies that no call on q can be

verified unless the caller has assigned b,,...,b
I
n
are all in the least class L.

to H, even if a.,... f a
I
m

The foregoing mechanism cannot therefore

be used to construct unrestricted procedures that yield low security
results from data in arbitrary security classes.
One solution, analogous to the PL/I GENERIC procedure for different
data types [17], is to prepare a separate version of q for each possible
combination of input security classes.

The viability of this approach is

questionable when there are many possible combinations of parameter security
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classes.
ways:

A more attractive solution results when q is restricted in two

its output parameters are derived solely from the input parameters

and information in the least class L; it is not permitted to write into
any other nonlocal objects.

(Local objects can be written if their values

are erased when q returns.)

The security of a call on such a restricted

procedure is verified whenever
a)

a. © ... 9 a •+ b , 8
—1
—m — I

8 b , and
-n

b)

e. 9 . . . 9 e. + b , 6 ... fl b .
—1
—k —1
—n

Table III gives the semantics for certifying these conditions.

Note that

condition (b) is verified by assigning the class b, B ... 9 b to the node
—I
—n
of the syntax tree associated with the cal1 statement, so that the implicit
flow is handled the same as in other statements.
A special case of these restricted procedures is the "function" type
procedure (e.g., SORT, LOG, SIN).

Here a procedure f is called during

expression evaluation (e.g., by f ( a j , . . . ) and returns with a single
result derived entirely from the input parameters and constants.

Since

there are no explicit output parameters, the function call can be treated
as any other expression with operands a.,...,a . Table 111 shows the syntax
I
m
and semantics for this case.

Syntax Rule
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<Inparams> ::= <exp>
<inparams> ::= <rnparams>^, <exp>

Al

<outparams> :: = <var>
<outparams>

<outparams>^, <var>

*»3

<stmt> :: =
cal1 <ident> (<inparams> ; <outparams>)

M

cfnca!l> ::= <ident> (<inparams>)
<factor> ::= <fncall>

Table III.

Certification of Restricted Procedure

Cert i f i cat ion Semant i cs
<inparams> := <exp>
<inparams> := <inparams>^ ® <exp>
<outparams> :~ <var>
<outparams> := <outparams>^ 0 <var>
if not <i npararcis> -+• <outparams> then
CERTIFIED
false
<stmt> := <outpar?ms>
<fnca11> := <i nparams>
<factor> := <fncal1>
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3.**

Exception Handling
Program traps caused by exceptional conditions -- underflow, overflow,

divide-by-zero, array subscript range, endfile, and so forth — require
special care [12],

They may cause statements subsequently executed to

depend on the variables that caused them.

The resulting flows will not

be detected by the mechanism defined so far.
The program in Figure 5 will be certified by our mechanism.

A

problem arises when sum overflows and the trap handler terminates the
program: the value of x can be approximated by MAX/LASTi, where MAX is the
largest value that can be stored in a register and LASTi is the last value
of i entered into file f.

The trap has effectively caused a flow of class H

information (x) into a class L file (f).

Had the programmer indicated the

possible loop termination by replacing the wh ile express ion e with "not
overflow sum", the invalid implicit flow from sum to f would have been
detected [5].
One solution -- inhibit all traps -- can be rejected, for it defeats
the purpose of traps.

Another solution would have the compiler test, for

each type of trap possible after each statement, the flow that would arise
should that trap occur.

This may be rejected for sheer inelegance and

i mpract i ca1i ty.
A practical solution is based on inhibiting all traps except those
for which actions have been defined explicitly by the program.

Such

definitions could be made with a statement similar to one used in PL/I £17 3on <condition> <ident> do <stmt>,

p:

begin
i: ? nteger secur? ty class L;
e: Boolean secur i ty class L;
f: file security class L;
x , sum; integer security class H;
begin
sum := 0;
i := 0;
e := true;
whi1e e do
begi n
sum := sum + x;
i := i + 1 ;
output I ^o f
end
end
end

Figure 5-

A program with invalid flow caused by a trap.

2b

where <condition> names a trap condition (underflow, overflow, endfile,
etc.), <ident> is the identifier to which the condition applies, and <stmt>
contains no gotos.
declaration section.

All on^ statements must appear as part of a program's
When the trap occurs, <stmt> is executed and control

is returned to the point of the trap.

Now: suppose there is an on statement

"on <condi t ion> y do <stmt>j", z is a variable receiving a flow in <stmt> J P
another statement <stmt> 2 in the program contains a reference (either
read or write) to y, and <exp> is a conditional expression in whose scope
<stmt>2 lies.

Since <stmt> 1 is potentially executed immediately after the

reference to y in <stmt>2» the implicit flow <exp> ^ z^ must be verified.
To avoid having the compiler backtrack to the on^ statement to verify
<exp>

z_, it is simpler to verify a stronger condition: ^ -»• £ when the

on statement is processed, and <exp>

^ when <stmt> 2 is processed.

The

requires a modification in the semantics: the class of any <stmt> is
defined as the greatest lower bound of all x^ such that x ei ther receives
a flow,

is an on^ condition identifier referenced, in <stmt>.

Only those

traps for which on_ statements have been declared will be enabled by the
compiler.

The program in Figure 5 would be (trivially) certified by this mechanism
since it would run with traps inhibited.

Had the programmer made clear his

intentions via the statement "or^ overflow sum do e : s fa 1se," the program
would not be certified.
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flpplications
4.1

The Confinement Problem
A service procedure Is confined as long as the system guarantees that

It can neither retain any customer Information nor encode It into any
value transmitted by a storage object [20, 21].

It is selectively

confined if this restriction applies only to confidential customer information
[5, 10].

Mechanisms enforcing varying degrees of confinement exist or have

been proposed [2, 14, 18, 20, 26, 27].
Our certifier is capable of verifying the partial, or total, confinement of a procedure (see Section 3-3).
meters Xj,. .. » x c » * c + | » • • • » x m ,

ar|

Let p be a procedure with input para-

d suppose that p is permitted to retain

information derived from the nonconfidential inputs xj,...,x , but not
from the confidential inputs x

il(

c+1

. . . . x . The confinement of p hinges
m

on three properties: 1) p must be Internally secure, 2) p must not write
Into any nonlocal object z for which
must Invoke only confined procedures.

•> z_ (c+l £ i <_ m),

and

3) p

By our definition of security,

property (1) implies that confidential information cannot be encoded in
supposedly nonconfidential results.

Property (2) insures that any Informa-

tion output from p is not derived from confidential Inputs,

(it does not,

however, prevent p from returning confidential results to the customer
through the output parameters.)

Property (3) requires that p cannot be

linked to any other procedure which might violate properties (1) or (2).
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k.2

State Variables
Invalid flows ("leaks") can occur in some systems when an observer

may examine system state variables and deduce information encoded in them
[6, 20, 26].

For example, a process could transmit a confidential value x

by locking out files fj,...,f ; an observer could determine x by counting
the number of locked files.

These flows can be regulated by associating

security classes with all state variables, and verifying flows to and
from them as with any other object in the system [21].

M

Data Bank Confidentiality
Suppose a system (or network of systems) has a large data base con-

taining different classes of information about individuals.

One class

might be employment records, another health records, others credit records,
tax records, criminal records, and so on.

Assuming that all access to the

data base must be performed using certified query and update procedures,
controlling flows is straightforward.
i.e., a static security class u_.

Let each user u have a clearance,

If u submits a query involving records

X j , . . . , x m o f the data base, the query procedure would verify
before accepting the request.

Similarly, if u submits an update request for

records yj,...,y n , the update procedure would verify u_-y ^
before accepting the request.

® ... € x^ -*•

0 ... 0

^

zy

5

Limitations
Lampson has identified three classes of paths, or "channels", by which

processes can transmit information out of their immediate environments [20]
Legitimate channels are the declared, formal outputs of the process; storage
channels are other storage objects in the nonlocal environment of the process;
and covert channels are any other transmission methods not Involving values
stored anywhere in the system.

Since the first two channels involve informa-

tion transmitted through storage objects In the system, their flows can be
verified by our mechanism.

The third, however, employs physical phenomena

to connect events within the computer with those outside; examples include
program running time, power consumption, noise, and electromagnetic radiation.
Flows along these channels are beyond the pale of our certification mechanism.
Various run time mechanisms must be used to deal with them.

Fenton [9, 10],

and Jones and Lipton [19], have shown how to construct mechanisms that prevent
an isolated program's running time from depending on confidential

information.

After a careful analysis, Lipner has concluded that sealing covert channels
associated with program running time is at best difficult, and may be impossible
in systems of shared resources [21].
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